Adapted
By Eliakim Willner
Eliakim Willner is author of “Nesivos Olam – Nesiv
HaTorah: An Appreciation of Torah Study”, a translation with commentary of a
work by the Maharal of Prague, published by Artscroll/Mesorah. He is currently
working on a continuation of the Nesivos Olam series, “Nesivos Olam – Nesiv
HaAvodah: The Philosophy and Practice of Prayer”.
Section 1 – A
seemingly unnecessary license
“Haneiros Halalu: These lights are sacred, so we
are not permitted to make use of them [to illuminate other objects]; we are
only permitted to view them” (Sofrim 20:6, recited while lighting the Menorah.)
This statement contains two inferences, both of which
are presented as consequences of the assertion that the Chanukah lights are
holy: 1) making use of the Chanukah
lights is prohibited, and 2) viewing the Chanukah lights is permitted. Now, it is clear how a
prohibition against making use of the Chanukah lights follows as a result of
their sanctity, in accordance with the general principle that one may not
derive benefit from objects designated for sacred purposes, but how does the
right to view the Chanukah lights follow as a result of their sanctity? It
seems obvious that we may view the Chanukah lights because viewing does not
constitute “use”, not because sanctity specifically implies a license to view.
Why, then, does this statement, which speaks of the consequences of the
sanctity of the Chanukah lights, mention that we are permitted to view them at
all?
Section 2 – A Jewish “master of science”: no blessing
“Upon seeing a Jewish scholar one
should recite the blessing, ‘Blessed are You... Who has apportioned from His
wisdom to those who revere Him’. Upon seeing a non-Jewish scholar one should recite
the blessing, ‘Blessed are You... Who has given of His wisdom to a
flesh-and-blood being’” (A Braiso in Brachos 58a, cited in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 224:6-7).
The difference in the wording of these two blessings
is apparently based on a distinction between the two different forms of wisdom
they deal with, since the focus of the Braiso
is on why the phrase, “Who has apportioned from”, is appropriate to one who is
versed in the wisdom of the Torah,
while the phrase, “Who has given of”, is appropriate to one who is versed in the wisdom of the natural sciences. But
the Braiso adds a stipulation that
extends the criteria for each blessing beyond form of wisdom alone: the person versed in Torah wisdom must
be Jewish, in order to create an obligation to recite the first blessing, and the person versed in the natural sciences
must be non-Jewish, in order to create an obligation to recite the second
blessing.
The reason for the first part of this stipulation is
obvious: Torah wisdom, when embodied in a non-Jew, counts for nothing, and
engenders no obligation at all, since the Torah describes itself as “an
inheritance of the congregation of Yaakov” (Devarim 33:4. The phrase, “The congregation of Yaakov”, explicitly
excludes non-Jews, as explained by the Gemara
in Sanhedrin 59a). The second part of the stipulation, however - that
natural sciences, when embodied in a Jew, also engender no obligation, and
there are no grounds whatever for reciting a blessing in this case - is an
astonishing revelation. In effect the Braiso
is saying that despite the fact that the natural sciences, in and of
themselves, generate an obligation to recite a blessing, if the person who has
mastered those sciences happens to be Jewish, his identity disqualifies his
knowledge from blessing! What are the underlying factors giving rise to this
disqualification?
Section 3 – No definitive proofs in Torah study
Our quest for the answer to this question will yield a
treasure trove in the form of a keen appreciation of the difference between
Torah wisdom and secular wisdom. The key to the treasure trove lies in the
words of the Ramban, in his introduction to Sefer
HaMilchamos: “As every student of Torah knows, in our discipline there is
no concept of definitive proof analogous to the procedural proofs of geometry
or the empirical proofs of astronomy”. Let us clearly articulate the full implications
of the statement that in the discipline of Torah study there is no concept of
definitive proof, as there is in the other disciplines mentioned above.
Section 4 – The covenant of preservation and the covenant of
origination
All the covenants mentioned in the Torah are without
term, and remain in effect “eternally, forever and to the end of time” (netazch, selah vo’ed; a phrase borrowed
from the Ahava Rabbah prayer). The Torah tells us this explicitly with respect to
Noach’s covenant of the rainbow (Beraishis
9:8-17) and Avrohom’s covenant of circumcision (Beraishis 17).
Different terminology is used, however, in describing the eternal nature of
each of these two covenants. We are told that the covenant of the rainbow is
eternal with the phrase l’doros olam, “for generations eternal”, while
the phrase bris olam, “an eternal covenant” is used to inform us of the
eternal nature of the circumcision covenant. To appreciate why the Torah makes
this distinction we must again review a recurrent theme in our Bais Medrash, noting that even if we
were to go over it one-hundred and one times, we would still not have plumbed
its depths nor grasped its full extent.
“Behold, I have set before you
today life [- if you follow the good course -] and death [- if you follow the
bad course -] ... you should choose life” (Devarim
30:15-19).
Now, the Torah as a whole was imparted to the Jews and
only to the Jews, so “...before you”
must be directed at the Jewish people, to the exclusion of everyone else. And
this is astounding. The ability to choose freely between good and bad - between
life and death - does not belong solely to Jews. Just as Jews are able to
exercise free choice with respect to their six-hundred and thirteen
commandments, so are non-Jews able to exercise free choice with respect to
their seven commandments, the seven Noachide laws. Thus the ability to choose
between two alternatives is equally applicable to all of Noach’s descendants -
to Jew and non-Jew alike. How, then, are we to understand the words of the verse,
“I have set [free choice] before you”
- which means before you and no one
else?
We now describe an approach that will lead us to the
correct interpretation of the verse.
The Torah conveys in detail how, prior to the events
at Sinai, there was a dialogue between the Jewish nation and Hashem regarding whether or not the Jews
would be willing to accept the obligations of the Torah and the commandments upon
themselves (Shmos 19:1-8). We find no such exchange recorded in connection
with the obligations of the seven Noachide laws. It is fair to conclude, then,
that the Noachide laws were imposed independent of any desire for them or any
consent to their imposition. In this the seven mitzvos differ from the six-hundred and thirteen, where the very
fact that the obligations exist is built upon the foundation of the give-and-take
that preceded their imposition. With respect to the six-hundred and thirteen,
there were two available alternatives: to accept them, or not to accept them, as
described in Shabbos 88a. There were no alternatives when the seven
commandments were imposed.
The difference between the two modes of
obligation-imposition is predicated on two fundamentally different states of
mind. We can best understand this difference by considering, as an example, the
contrast between the state of mind that functions to create a debt and the state of mind that functions to pay a debt. The state of mind that
functions to create a debt is
capable of originating something new - since, without an affirmative desire to
create a debt, there is no debt. It is precisely the state of mind - this type of state of mind - which
brings the obligation into existence. On the other hand, the state of mind that
functions to pay a debt is merely
going along with a situation not of its own making. It is possible, after all,
to collect a debt from a person against his will and without his knowledge, so,
even when a person willingly pays a debt, his mind is merely acknowledging the
reality of a situation external to it. In no way can his mind be said to be originating a situation of payment.
This example illustrates that the state of mind at
play when an obligation is created and the state of mind at play when an
obligation is discharged involve two distinct aspects of the intellect. We will
refer to them as the Originative Intellect and the Consentive Intellect. The
distinction between these two forms of intellect is precisely what
differentiates between the state of mind that functions in the realm of the
seven Noachide laws and the state of mind that functions in the realm of the
six-hundred and thirteen commandments.
The state of mind that functions in the realm of the
seven Noachide laws represents the Consentive Intellect. It does no more than
rubber-stamp a pre-existing situation, since the intellect played no role in
originating the obligations of the seven Noachide laws - they were not conditioned
on any prior dialogue between Hashem,
who gave them, and mankind, upon whom they were imposed. The state of mind that
functions in the realm of the six-hundred and thirteen commandments, however,
represents the Originative Intellect, since it was only by virtue of the mind’s
power that the imperatives and obligations of the commandments were put into
place. They could not have come to be without a prior affirmative decision to
accept the commandments.
To appreciate the full implications of the difference
between these two forms of intellect we must reflect on how each conforms to
the system of commandments to which it corresponds. Let us explain.
Our Sages teach (Kiddushin 39b), with respect to the
six-hundred and thirteen commandments, that “there is not a single commandment
in the Torah... whose effects are not felt during the era of the resuscitation
of the dead”. The true reward for performing the commandments is not in this
world, but in the world-to-come; the world after the dead are resuscitated. A
Jew’s status in the world to come is determined by the extent and quality of
his performance of the six-hundred and thirteen commandments, thus these
commandments bring the universe into the era of the world-to-come, and shape
its form. See Rambam, Hilchos Teshuva 9. Thus, the covenant of the
six-hundred and thirteen commandments is the covenant of the world-to-come.
It is impossible, however, to advance the world into
the era of the resuscitation of the dead through fulfillment of the seven
Noachide laws. Hashem’s covenant with
Noach guarantees only to preserve the status quo: there will never be a repeat
of the flood, there will never be another world-wide purge; never again will
the laws that maintain nature be suspended. The difference between the function
of the six-hundred and thirteen commandments and that of the seven Noachide
laws is that the six-hundred and thirteen bring into being a new world order
based on life without death, whereas the seven Noachide laws serve merely to
perpetuate the prevailing state of affairs.
This is how, as we said, each of the two forms of
intellect conforms to the system of commandments to which it corresponds. Since
the purpose of the six-hundred and thirteen is to establish a new world order, this system of
commandments is contingent on the Originative Intellect and could not have been
imposed without its involvement - without the involvement of the state of mind
that creates a new state of affairs.
But since the purpose of the seven Noachide laws is to preserve that which
already exists, this system of commandments is not contingent on the
Originative Intellect - the seven Noachide laws were not prefaced by an
affirmative decision to accept them. These commandments are contingent rather
on the Consentive Intellect, which comes into play after the commandments are imposed, since the only decision in the
domain of the Consentive Intellect is whether or not to carry out an existing obligation
after the fact of its imposition, not whether or not to be bound by the
obligation in the first place. The opportunity to decide whether or not to
accept the seven Noachide laws was never offered.
It should be obvious that the relationship between the
system consisting of the six-hundred and thirteen commandments and the
Originative Intellect applies not only to the covenant of Sinai - where the
role of the Originative Intellect is explicit - but to every covenant associated
with the Torah and its commandments. We speak here in terms of the covenant of
Sinai since it is the starting point of all such covenants and thus serves as
the paradigm for all subsequent, related covenants. Each of these covenants, in
its own way, is a product of the Originative Intellect, and none of these
covenants could have come to be without a prior affirmative decision to be
bound by it, on the part of those destined to be bound by it. For, each of
these covenants, in its own way, further cements the association, created at
Sinai, between the Jewish nation and the Torah. And the basis of this
association is the fact that, as noted earlier, “there is not a single
commandment in the Torah whose effects are not felt during the era of the
resuscitation of the dead”. The defining characteristic of the association
between the Jewish nation and the Torah is the ability to originate the new world order of the era of the resuscitation of
the dead and the world-to-come. It is therefore essential that the aspect of
the intellect functioning in the realm of this association be originative, not
merely acquiescent and consentive.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there
is a direct correspondence between a covenental bond and the aspect of the intellect
that pertains to the bond. Since the distinctive feature of Noach’s seven-commandments
bond is staving off destruction and preserving the status quo it pertains to
the aspect of the intellect that deals with reactive decisions. This aspect of the intellect can react to the bond either by submitting
to its demands and agreeing to carry them out, or by opposing its demands and
failing to carry them out. But in no way can it be claimed, in this case, that
the intellect engendered the bond,
since the nature of the bond itself is merely preservative, not creative. The
distinctive feature of the Jewish nation’s Torah bond, on the other hand, is to
originate a new world order. So it
pertains to the aspect of the intellect that deals with proactive decisions - the aspect of the intellect without which
that covenental bond could not originally have come into existence.
This principle is a cornerstone of Jewish
philosophical and ethical thought.
Now we are prepared to understand the simple meaning
of the verse which proclaims, “Behold, I have set before you... the good... and
the bad”. “Before you”. Specifically, “Before you” - the Jewish nation. We found this
astounding; the ability to choose freely between good and evil is in no way
limited to the Jewish nation. The correct interpretation of this verse,
however, lies in what we are saying. The verse must be understood not as a
reference to simple free choice but as an exhortation
with accompanying explanation: the exhortation is in the form of a
reminder of the exalted and awesome status attached to fulfillment of the Torah
and its commandments (“life... death”). The explanation - the reason we are well-advised to heed the
exhortation - is contained in the words, “I have set before you”. The verse does not refer to the
alternatives of fulfilling the commandments on the one hand and violating them,
on the other, as we might have thought. Rather, the reference is to the fact
that the Torah and commandments themselves became
binding as a result of an intellectual decision. In other words, the
reference in the verse is to the initial choice set before the Jewish nation
regarding whether or not to permit themselves to become bound by the Torah in
the first place, not to a choice - after the Torah was accepted - regarding
whether or not to fulfill already-binding commandments.
Entry into the covenant of the commandments was by way of
an intellectual decision portending the entry. And since the covenant of the
six-hundred and thirteen commandments was engendered
by the intellect, fulfillment of those commandments must itself possess the
power to engender a new world order
based on a new set of premises and with new modes of thought. The verse is in
effect saying, “Your actions have life-and-death repercussions in the new world
order, because they stem from the Originative Intellect, with which you bound
yourself to the Torah and commandments (I have set before you...). Be sure to
act in a manner such that the repercussions are positive! (Choose life)”
This choice is truly, exclusively, before you - the Jewish nation. The intent is to
explicitly exclude the covenental bond of Noach and the seven commandments,
since only the covenental bond that originated
through the intellect has the power to itself originate new modes of thought;
to bring into existence the new modes of thought appropriate to the
world-to-come. The covenant of the seven Noachide laws is powerless to bring
into existence new modes of thought because it was imposed independent of the
intellect.
As we said, this verse is an exhortation with accompanying explanation:
“Behold, I have set before you today life and death; the good course and the
bad course... you should choose life.”
The astute reader will appreciate how neatly the
contrast between the physical manifestations of Noach’s and Avrohom’s covenants
meshes with the distinction between Noach’s covenant, itself, and the Torah
covenant, itself. The physical manifestation of Noach’s covenant is the rainbow
(Beraishis 9:12); of Avrohom’s covenant, the rite of circumcision (Beraishis
17:11). Note that, as the Ramban explains, the rainbow was not specially
created at the time the covenant of Noach was consummated, for the express
purpose of serving as its symbol, but had been in existence since Creation. At
the time of Noach’s covenant it was merely conscripted to symbolize that
covenant. This fits beautifully with the substance of our present discussion.
The physical manifestations of the two covenants
differ, in precisely the same manner as the covenants themselves differ in
their essence. As we explained, the essential difference between the covenants
is that Noach’s covenant represents no more than a preservation of the status
quo, while Avrohom’s covenant represents an ongoing participation in the
construction of a new world-in-formation (The reference is to the new world
order of the world-to-come. The previous discussion related the Torah
covenant to the formation of this new world order. However, Avrohom’s
covenant laid the groundwork for the giving of the Torah to the Jewish
nation, so it is considered a subsidiary of the Torah covenant even though it
chronologically preceded it.). The difference between the two physical
manifestations is along precisely the same lines. The physical manifestation of
Noach’s covenant was borrowed from an existing
aspect of creation - an aspect which was merely assigned the additional role of
covenental symbol. But the physical manifestation of Avrohom’s covenant is the
recasting of man into a new form,
via circumcision.
In fact, this distinction between the covenant of
Noach and that of Avrohom is not only apparent in each covenant’s physical
manifestation, it is also explicit in the terminology used by the Torah to
describe the respective covenants. The phrase “for generations eternal” is used
to describe Noach’s covenant, while “an eternal covenant” is used with respect
to Avrohom’s covenant. The word “generations” was deliberately omitted from the
description of Avrohom’s covenant because of the originative nature of Avrohom’s
covenant.
Noach’s covenant is a preservation of the status quo.
It originates nothing and invokes no change in the world’s operation, so every
generation relates to it in the same way. The status quo is either preserved or
it is not; Noach’s covenant guarantees that it is, for all generations, so each
generation has the same “degree” of status quo preservation. The phrase, “for generations eternal”, is appropriate to
such a covenant, since the covenant functions on the identical level for each
generation. The essence of Avrohom’s covenant, however, is the promise that,
through the Jewish nation’s fulfillment of the six-hundred and thirteen
commandments of the Torah, a new world order will be created. It is possible, therefore, for this
covenant to function on different levels. At times, the full potency of this
covenant’s promise is evident; at times, it is concealed. There are epochs of
redemption; there are epochs of exile. There are various degrees of exile;
there are various degrees of redemption. Different generations relate to the
covenant of Avrohom in different ways.
Since by definition the process of creation is
dynamic, it need not and does not function at the same level of intensity at
all times. But status quo preservation is static; the status quo is an
already-quantified entity and preserving it is a matter of preserving a steady
state. Thus, the word “generations” was left out of the description of
Avrohom’s covenant. It is described in terms of “an eternal covenant” to
indicate that this covenant relates generally to the universe, but not
individually to each generation. Avrohom’s covenant can only be referred to as
“an eternal covenant”.
Section 5 – No definitive proofs: the Torah’s pride and glory
The stage has now been properly set for us to appreciate
the full implications of the Ramban’s statement that, in the discipline of
Torah study, there is no concept of definitive proof analogous to the
procedural proofs of geometry or the empirical proofs of astronomy. This
statement does not reflect, as might be thought, a shortcoming in the
discipline of Torah study, requiring us to rationalize the absence of the sort
of clear-cut evidence, and the conclusive demonstrations of fact, that the
device of definitive proof permits to practitioners of disciplines like
geometry and astronomy. Not at all; in fact, the most remarkable feature of the
discipline of Torah study - its pride and glory - is the very absence of the
concept of definitive proof from within its domain!
Let us explain. The distinction between the covenant
of Noach and the covenant of Avrohom is brought into sharpest relief in the
area of the disciplines of inquiry associated with each covenant - the
discipline that deals with reality as viewed through the covenant-of-Noach
lens, versus the discipline that deals with reality as viewed through the covenant-of-Avrohom
lens. Noach’s covenant guarantees the continuity, as-is, of that which already
exists. The discipline of inquiry associated with this facet of reality thus
focuses on intellectually comprehending, to the extent possible, the as-is
state of the universe. The covenant of Avrohom, on the other hand, deals not
with preservation, but with the origination of a new world order. Thus,
correspondingly, the discipline of inquiry associated with this covenant deals
not with delving into the status quo but with exploring the ways and means of
going about the process of originating the new reality that will fructify in
the world-to-come, and with attempting to understand the forces at play in this
process of origination.
Here we have zeroed in on the crux of “definitive
proof” and its application. The character of every discipline’s definitive
proof derives from the nature of the reality that the discipline deals with and
explores. Each discipline deals with reality from a different angle, and on
that basis each discipline gives rise to a specifically applicable
proof-system. But all this applies only to disciplines that deal with the
here-and-now. The entire concept of definitive proof is alien to the discipline
of Torah study, which is distinguished in that it deals with the origination of
a future world, and not with the here-and-now. The only
“definitive proof”-type test the discipline of Torah study will ultimately be
subject to awaits the as-yet nebulous world-to-come. But for the time being, it
is impossible for the discipline of Torah study to employ the construct of
definitive proof.
This inability, as we said, is its pride and glory. To
grant that it is possible for the discipline of Torah study to employ the
construct of definitive proof would be to relegate Torah study to the mere
status of a discipline that investigates
reality, rather than a discipline that originates
reality. And the notion that the discipline of Torah study might actually fit
into the role of an investigative discipline is a logical impossibility. In the
same way it is impossible for the physical representation of the covenant
guaranteeing the epoch of the world-to-come to be a rainbow, so, exactly, is it
impossible for the construct of definitive proof to exist in the realm of the
discipline of Torah study. We cannot symbolize a covenant whose reason for
existence is the origination of a new world order, using an existing device,
borrowed from the old world order, since this would contradict and thus subvert
the very function the covenant is designed to perform.
Section 6 – A Jew masters science: wisdom misplaced
We have reached the point where we may return to, and
fully appreciate, the significance of the momentous halachic ruling we spoke of in Section 2: Despite the fact that the
presence of the natural sciences, in and of itself, generates an obligation to
recite a blessing, if the person who has mastered those sciences happens to be
Jewish, his identity disqualifies his knowledge from blessing. We will explain
the underlying cause of this disqualification with an example.
There is a restriction that applies to the “spices”
blessing, which was enacted to be recited upon encountering a pleasant
fragrance: the blessing is recited only in the event that the spices are
specifically designated for the purpose of providing olfactory pleasure. If the
spices are not specifically designated for that purpose, then no blessing is
recited, even if the spices do in fact emit a pleasurable aroma (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 217:2-3). Sensing a pleasant aroma does not generate a
blessing obligation unless the aroma emanates from a source whose purpose it is
to smell pleasant. The blessing obligation is engendered not by the pleasant
aroma per se, but rather by its
source’s specific designation for aroma production.
A pleasant aroma that emanates from a source not
specifically designated for that purpose is considered incidental. Blessings are required only when the characteristic of
the source object that pertains to the blessing is essential. Characteristics that are incidental are not deemed sufficiently
significant to require a blessing.
So much for our example. Now, the same principle we
saw in connection with aromas, also applies with respect to manifestations of
wisdom. The intellect of a Jew is specifically designated for the discipline
that creates a new world order - for the study of Torah. If, instead, wisdom
dealing with investigating the status quo emanates from a Jewish intellect, it
is a case of wisdom misplaced. That form of wisdom, in that intellect, is not
essential but incidental. And we have already established the principle that
incidental characteristics are not sufficiently significant to require a
blessing! It is exactly as if a Jew were to accept a creed based on a belief
that there will be no repetition of the flood, instead of on a belief in
resuscitation of the dead, and attempted to fulfill his religious obligations
through the covenant of the rainbow instead of through the covenant of
circumcision.
Section 7 – Relating to a source versus relating to a consequence
.rut vtrb lrutc ohhj ruen lng hf
“For the source of life is in Your domain; with Your light, we see light (Tehillim 36:10).” Let us attentively reflect on the fundamental message of this
pronouncement. It is possible to perceive light in two different ways - either
by seeing objects that are illuminated by the light, or, not by seeing objects,
but by beholding the light source itself. The first way, our perception of the
light is oblique. The second way, our perception of the light is direct. The
first way, we perceive the light as a by-product since all we actually see are
the objects it illuminates. The second way, we perceive the light source first-hand.
The declaration that, “with Your light, we see light”
is intended to exclude the first way from consideration. It teaches us that we
must perceive Hashem’s light not via secondary indicators of its existence, but
rather via first-hand encounter. In other words, the phrase should be
understood as, “with [respect to] Your light, we [must] see [the] light”.
Why? Because “the source of life is
in Your domain”; since You are the source of life, our perception of Your light
has to be source-oriented. Were we to perceive Your light by “seeing
illuminated objects”, so to speak, our perception would be oblique and thus not
suited to the Life-Source. Because
“the source of life is in Your
domain”, we must perceive Your light in a source-oriented manner.
It is important to realize that this principle forms
the basis for the words, cited at the beginning of this Ma’amar, referring to the lights of the Chanukah Menorah: “These
lights are sacred, so we are not permitted to make use of them [to illuminate
other objects]; we are only permitted to view them”. The Sages who authored the
HaNeiros HaLalu prayer did so with
the verse, “with Your light, we see light”, in mind. The underlying meaning of
the “These lights are sacred...” phrase is that the lights of the Chanukah
Menorah burn in order that their light be perceived in its own right, as a
source, not through the secondary effect of their illumination of the
surrounding area. “We are not permitted to make use of them [to illuminate
other objects]; we are only permitted to view them”.
Why were the lights of the Chanukah Menorah singled
out to embody the message of the “with Your light, we see light” verse? Because
the Chanukah lights commemorate our liberation from the Greek exile. The Greek
exile is unique in that its primary objective is to subordinate the discipline
of Torah study to the secular disciplines of inquiry. This attempt at
subordination has many aspects - and one of them takes the form of an intense
pressure to address the audacious charge that our discipline is inferior to
theirs in that it lacks the device of definitive proof. The surest way to knock
the underpinnings out from under this audacious charge, and thereby free
ourselves from its pressure, is to clearly understand that the discipline of
Torah study is not an outgrowth of
the reality it deals with, as are the secular disciplines, but rather the source of a new, yet-to-be-realized
reality. It is for this reason alone that definitive proofs are absent from the
discipline of Torah study. In this light the discipline of Torah study is a
wellspring, which must be perceived directly, and not second-hand, through its
after-effects, which is essentially how “definitive proof” operates.
The premises which the natural sciences draw upon to
construct “definitive proofs” are all based on observation of the physical world
as it stands. This is because the natural sciences are no more than an attempt
to understand the pre-existing laws of nature. Establishing laws of
nature is outside the realm of natural science, and the very concept of
“definitive proof” is inapplicable when a new world order is under construction
and its laws of nature are in the process of first being defined. The exalted
role of creating the new world order - the world order of the world-to-come -
belongs exclusively to the discipline of Torah study. Thus, its lack of
definitive proof is a badge of honor, to be worn with pride, not a badge of
shame.
The purpose of the Chanukah lights is to reflect the
“lights” of redemption - the redemption of the discipline of Torah study from
its “exile”; its subordination to the secular disciplines. By definition, then,
these lights of redemption are effective only to the extent that they cause us
to sense the originative quality of the Torah.
“For the source of life is in Your domain; with Your
light, we see light.”
[And therefore...]
“These lights are sacred, so we are not permitted to
make use of them [to illuminate other objects]; we are only permitted to view
them”.
Question 2
Answer: Section 6
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