Da’as Torah on Da’as Torah
A Shmues by HaRav Yitzchok Hutner, Z’tl
Transcribed and adapted for publication by Eli Willner
Introduction
In the year prior to Rav
Hutner’s departure to Eretz Yisroel he said a chaburah on topics of
interest and concern to the bnei ha’chaburah. After delivering this
particular shmues Rav Hutner called me over and requested that I adapt
it into an English article for publication. I did so, and submitted the article
below to him for review. The Rosh Yeshiva suggested changes, which were
incorporated into the article, and approved it for publication, but for various
reasons it was not published at the time.
The title and section headings
are supplied by me.
Eli Willner
Why Not More Proactive Guidance?
Many are the issues that confront the Torah-observant Jew
today. Which candidate merits his support in a national or local election? What
position should he assume vis-à-vis the occupied territories? These questions
and numerous others like them are issues of current concern in committed
Orthodox circles. They are the daily grist for the mills of the Jewish media
and are for that reason the constant preoccupation of the conscientious Jew,
eager to adopt a stand in accordance with the view of the Torah. The burden of
these questions therefore often engenders still another question — a question
considered by many to be more potent than the others, and that is, why do our
Gedolim not, in each problematic situation, establish for us the proper
position from the Torah perspective? Or, as many public commentators on the Jewish
scene cry, why do our Gedolim leave us on the dark on vital questions that beg
for answers? In the process of answering this last question we will be looking
in two directions, examining the nature and defining the limits of Da'as Torah.
Da’as Torah in Divrei Reshus
The usual connotation of the Da'as Torah concept as it is
used in Torah circles includes the idea that the views and opinions of our
Gedolim, our Torah sages, are ipso facto equivalent in any situation to the
view of the Torah. Every opinion uttered by a Gadol is spoken with the voice of
Torah and stamped with the authority of Torah. It is doubtful that any thinking
person would question the propriety of a Gadol addressing himself to a question
that falls within the purview of the four sections of the Shulchan Aruch. That
is his field of expertise, the area in which he has received his training and
over which he has proven his mastery. The most hidebound secularist would admit
that the Gadol is the ultimate authority in the field of halacha, just as the doctor is the authority in the field of
medicine or the lawyer the authority in the field of jurisprudence.
The authority of a Gadol to decide issues outside the sphere
of halacha is often challenged,
however. When we arrive at the area of divrei
reshus, dilemmas left unresolved by halacha, the gray area that is
commonly referred to as the "fifth Shulchan Aruch", many
well-intentioned but ignorant individuals dispute the Gadol's preeminence with
the argument that the Gadol, with his lofty focus of vision, is unqualified to
deal with such mundane matters as a current worldly issue, for example.
Problems of this sort, these individuals would maintain, are best left to men
of the world, who are experienced in such matters.
It must be understood that this misapprehension of the
Gadol's role with its accompanying rationale date back no further than two
hundred years, to the birth of the various reform movements in Germany and
later, to the birth of the Zionist movement in Russia. This denial of a basic
principle of Yiddishkeit (later in this article it will be seen that the
supremacy of the Gadol's authority in every facet of life is a basic principle
of Yiddishkeit) can be traced directly back to when, for the first time in the
history of our people an organized movement in opposition to the authority of
Torah took root. True, throughout our history there have been individuals who threw
off the yoke of mitzvos, but until
two hundred years ago there were no formal institutions in our midst that ran
counter to the Torah rule. What had until then been scattered instances of
disobedience thereafter became organized rebellion, an evil that formerly
claimed an insignificant few in each generation grew to encompass an entire state,
a medina that marches under the
banner of anti-Torah. This tragic situation, grown to such unfortunate
proportions today, began, as we have said, no more than two hundred years ago
and two hundred years ago the foundation was laid for the repudiation of Da'as
Torah that is exemplified by the type of argument mentioned in the previous
paragraph.
Of course, those who were "enlightened" themselves
had and have no need for a rationale. Having totally rejected the authority of
Torah; they are not troubled when they go against the rulings of the Torah
authorities. People who basically wish to remain observant Jews but find it
more convenient for whatever reason to take a position antagonistic to Da'as
Torah — a position legitimized by the anti-Torah organizations — cannot so
easily brush off the guidance of the Gedolim, however. These are the people
who, swayed by the public opinion generated by the Torah-free establishment and
yet uncomfortable in their new-found rebellious role, rationalize their
disobedience in the manner described. Unfortunately, with public opinion as
strong a force as it is today, far too many people fall into this latter
category. We will have more to say on the subject of public opinion later in
this article.
The extended authority of the Gadol to areas ungoverned by halacha is called Keser Torah, the crown of Torah. The precise nature of Keser Torah, the means of acquiring it[i]
and of judging who possesses it and who does not are beyond the scope of the
present discussion. These subjects are treated extensively in Sefer Pachad Yitzchok,
Shevuos Ma'amor thirty-six, by HaGaon HaRav Yitzchok Hutner, shlita. The following few paragraphs are
in the nature of a synopsis of sections from that ma'amor.
The field of a Jew's
activities can be divided into two domains: mitzvah-regulated
activities and unregulated activities. The rule is however, that hakol boroh
lichvodo — the purpose of all creation is the glory of G-d — and therefore
the privilege to perform unregulated activities is to be regarded as an
opportunity, for those Jews willing to take it, for the consecration of the
entire sphere of their activities to Hashem. This division of activities into
two domains applies not only to the Jew as an individual but also to the Jewish
nation as a whole. In the latter case, however, the two domains
of activity generate two
domains of authority. As the Ran explains in his Droshos,[ii]
Sanhedrin is the authority in the area of mitzvah-regulated
activities. It's power extends to the determination of Torah law — questions of
permitted or prohibited, guilty or not guilty, clean or unclean, sacred or
profane. Questions of this sort are decided by Sanhedrin, whose view in these
matters is the Torah view — Da'as Torah. Their rulings are arrived at solely
within the context of the body of Torah law. The leadership of the nation in
the area of its unlegislated (by mitzvahh)
activities — that is to say, the determination of which course of action will
lead to the greater glory of HKBH — is in the hands of the king of Yisroel,
however. His primary jurisdiction lies in the area of situational decisions,
because to assess which course of action out of many will bring about the
greatest glory of Hashem must of necessity involve the consideration of
circumstances and conditions specific' to a particular situation. In contrast,
the primary jurisdiction of Sanhedrin is in the area of decisions for posterity
exclusively, for judgments in the area of mitzvahh-fulfillment
are handed down for all generations to come.
Although it would appear from
the foregoing that there are two independent categories of intelligence, with
one to manage that which is holy and another to manage the sanctification of
the not-yet-holy, this in fact is not the case. That this is true is evident in
the halacha that establishes that a
king may be installed only by virtue of the power of Sanhedrin. In effect this halacha teaches us that, with respect to
the Jewish nation as a whole, the intelligence that decides questions
pertaining to non-mitzvah regulated activities
is a child of the intelligence that is empowered to decide questions pertaining
to sacred, mitzvah-regulated
activities. The former intelligence has its own modus operandi but the source
whence it derives its power is the intelligence that rules over the realm of
sanctity itself, enacting from the eternal body of Torah law rulings to endure
forever.
Contrary to the usual order
of things we exemplify a condition that holds true in the case of each
individual by showing how it holds true in the case of the nation as a whole.
For the fact of the matter is that the two types of intelligence mentioned
above in connection with Am Yisroel function in the individual as well as in
the nation, each in its own particular way. In the individual as well as in the
nation, the intelligence that decides questions that arise in the area of mitzvah-fulfillment has established halachos
upon which to base its judgment while the intelligence that decides between
alternative courses of conduct in the area of non-mitzvah regulated activities has no set rules upon which to rely.
For sometimes greater kovod shomayim results from active striving for a
particular goal, sometimes from a more passive placing of faith in HKBH; sometimes
from adopting a submissive posture, and sometimes from acting more assertively.
In all such cases the decision depends on a sensitive appraisal of the
situation as it stands at the time of decision.
Each and every Jew must
realize that, with respect to the individual too, "A king may only be
installed by virtue of the power of Sanhedrin". The intelligence that
decides questions in the area of non-mitzvah
regulated activities is not self-sustaining; rather, the efficacy of that
intelligence as it functions to sanctify actions in the non-regulated realm is
dependent totally for its existence on the intelligence that functions in the
body of sanctity itself, determining law in the area of mitzvah fulfillment that will endure for generations, along with
all the rest of the Torah. The intelligence for situational decisions rests
completely on the intelligence for eternal decisions.
We must realize that we are
not dealing here with a natural property belonging to the faculty of reason. We
are saying that the one whose merit enabled him to reach that level in Torah
that is asukei shmaitso aliba d’hilchisa, "concluding a decision
according to law", is the one and only one whose powers of resolution are
sufficiently sure for him to be trusted with decisions that depend on a dynamic
situation with constantly changing conditions, decisions that relate not to the
established laws of mitzvah-fulfillment,
but to the manner of bringing that which is non-regulated into the realm of the
sanctified.
The link between the ability
of the intelligence to decide questions in an area that has set rules and its
ability to resolve issues in an area which permits nothing more than estimation
and the considered weighing of whichever alternatives are presented by the
circumstances — this link between the two categories of intelligence does not
operate under natural law. It is an extra-ordinary link; appearing as a wonder,
and similar to the other wondrous capabilities that are in attendance with
Torah.
It is the crown of Torah — kisra
shel Torah. Someone who, through his mastery of the ability to
"conclude a decision according to law" in the area of mitzvos, has gained the ability to
determine the proper mode of service to HKBH in the area of divrei r’shus may be said to have earned
the crown of Torah. He may apply to himself the posuk — bi melachim
yimlochu,[iii] “by my
power shall kings reign”. He is the one who, in a manner of speaking,
"installs a king with the authority of Sanhedrin".
His ability really is, as we
have said, a supernatural one, properly termed "wonder" for in truth the
sort of perception that is needed for successfully confronting worldly dilemmas
is totally incongruent with that needed for setting down law for eternity.
Anyone understanding of human nature will realize that a person who
distinguishes himself in one of those areas is not likely to distinguish
himself in the other. And it is correct to generalize from the commentary of
the Ramah[iv]
on the brocho that concludes with umafli la'asos,"and
performing wonders" (the Ramah explains that those very words refer to
HKBH's conjunction of the spiritual and the material) and state that any tying together
of two incompatible items falls under the heading of "wonder". The
wonder that is the combination in one individual of the two types of perception
required for issuing rulings for eternity and for issuing rulings local to a
point in time is one of the remarkable attainments that are the reward of
Torah.
To summarize the words of Rav Hutner shlita, the authority to decide questions of halacha and the king-like authority to decide day-to-day questions
outside the scope of halacha —
questions pertaining to how Jews must react as individuals or as a nation in
situations they may be confronted with at given times — are not, as one might
suppose, two separate and independent domains of authority. Rather, the
authority — we may even say the capability — to decide questions of the second
sort follows as a result of the achievement on the part of the Posek of a level
high enough to allow him to answer questions of the first sort. Torah knowledge
is a prerequisite for Keser Torah
then, but it is itself not a sufficient condition for Keser Torah, which is a G-d -given segulah that comes only
to one who is amel BaTorah, one who diligently labors at the task of
acquiring Torah. Someone who meets both conditions, knowledge and ameilus has earned the Keser Torah. Of such a person does the posuk declare "by my power shall
kings reign".
Parenthetically, let us add that not everyone who possesses
the Keser Torah has it to the same
degree. The relative "size" of a person's Keser is a function of the
strength of that persons claim to both the abovementioned factors. Also we must
point out that a person is often faced with contradictory opinions from
different (equally recognized) Gedolim. In that event he must Lahalacha follow his personal sense of
trust. His decision will then be intuitive rather than rational, but if he acts
in good faith; if he is motivated purely by the desire to do what is right, he
will not be lead astray. Consider, as an illustration, that as long as a person
is healthy he may not be able to say which of two doctors with similar
credentials he would select to treat him, should the need for a doctor arise.
But if he were to fall ill and receive mutually exclusive advice from the two
doctors he would at that time recognize his latent instinctive preference for
one doctor or the other. The pressure of the decision determines where his
loyalties lie and he follows that doctor's prescription. There is surely no
need to elaborate on this parallel. The same process is involved when one must
act according to the opinion of either one Gadol or another.
Da’as Torah – Limitations
Peripheral issues aside, it should be clear to the reader
that when a Gadol does speak out on any subject his word is authoritative, and
that challenges to his competency based on a putative lack of expertise in a
specialized area bespeak a faulty understanding of the nature of Da'as Torah,
reveal the influence of the anti-Torah establishment and are, in fact, totally
baseless.
It must be understood withal, however, that there are in a
sense restrictions on the questions to which a Gadol may address himself in
that no Gadol regardless of stature can rule on any problem, regardless of the
area in which it falls simply by referencing the appropriate weighty tomes in
his library. siyato dishmayo is the
sine qua non for every one of his decisions. Even the Gadol engaged in pilpul, rhetorical discourse, requires a
certain degree of siyato dishmayo.
The Gadol attempting to decide a question in halacha requires still more siyato
dishmayo, but the Gadol who must respond to a difficulty in an area
unregulated by halacha requires a far
far greater degree of siyato dishmayo. And — this is crucial — siyato
dishmayo is forthcoming only when the response to a question has an immediate,
practical application. On a hypothetical question, on a question
conjured up "for the sake of discussion", there is no siyato dishmayo and thus the Gadol's
hands are tied; his lips sealed. This is true because every Gadol is a
"fragment" of Moshe Rabbeinu so to speak, and the authority of every
Gadol to decide questions for Yisroel is an outgrowth of Moshe Rabbeinu's
authority. HKBH told Moshe after the transgression of the Eigel, lech raid
ki shichais amcha,[v] which
the Gemorah explains to mean, lech
raid migadlusecha – klum nosati l’cho gedulah elah bishvil Yisroel,[vi]
"step down from your exalted position — have I given you eminence for any
reason other than to serve Yisroel?". Whenever any sort of barrier
interposes between the Gadlus of Moshe — or by extension any Gadol — and his
ability to concretely serve Yisroel, the Gadol is cut off from siyato dishmayo; stripped of his Gadlus,
as it were. Every Gadol hears lech raid echoing as a caution in his ear
whenever his powers are called upon. Therefore a Gadol will speak only when his
advice will directly serve Yisroel.
It follows that whether or not a Gadol can respond to a
particular question depends more on the enquirer than on the respondent. If the
question is a real one, if the person asking it is willing in all humility to
submit to the ruling of the Gadol and if the person will have a voice in the
implementation of the ruling, then and only then can the Gadol consider the
question and rely on divine assistance as he formulates his response. But if
the question is speculative, if the enquirer is, let us say, a journalist
looking for copy, and if the sole effect of the Gadol's response is an article
that will appear in the in the next day's newspaper, no divine assistance will
be forthcoming and no reputable Gadol will consent to reply. Indeed, while it
is difficult to ascertain authentic Gadlus, there is one sure test to detect
the charlatan. Anyone posturing before television cameras, ready to spout
"Da'as Torah” on any and every vacuous question belongs in that category.
The true Gadol in contrast, knows that his role is not that of a puppet of the
press, his function not that of an oracle spewing forth empty pronouncements on
sundry subjects for the benefit of an appreciative audience.
The legitimate Gadol responds only to real questions. Thus,
when he is approached by a person in authority regarding the question of which
territories to surrender in return for which concessions, for example, he responds.
Under these circumstances his response is solidly grounded in siyato dishmayo. In a land whose
bureaucracy operates under civil law, however (a la Ben Gurion's declaration
that "This country is one of civil law, not one of halacha")
scenarios like the hypothetical one described are not likely to take place.
It is curious that people who, lehavdil, accept that
a secular court such as the United States Supreme Court will rule only on
matters of fact (such as a test case) and not on unsubstantial issues will not
accept the same principle when applied to a non-secular situation such as the
one under discussion. Nevertheless, it is so much more so true when the
authority is Da'as Torah that the case must be real and relevant before there
can be a response, as has been explained.
Public Opinion Versus Da’as Torah
We alluded earlier to several evils which we traced back to
the negative influence of public opinion.[vii]
Public opinion as a mover of individuals is certainly not a modern innovation,
but it has taken on a new character in present times, with respect to both the
extent of its influence and the nature of its genesis. It is certainly a far
more pervasive force today than it has been in the past. It is also true,
however, that while in the past public opinion was no more than the sum of the
views commonly held and spontaneously generated by the bulk of the populace, it
is today a synthetic product manufactured at the behest of a few individuals of
means in positions of power. Wishing to foster points of view beneficial to
themselves, they bring in public relations experts, hire press and advertising
agents, and foist their interests on the masses through the various media.
Public opinion is a purchased commodity; people are regularly misled by it and
made to dance to its. tune.
It is customary to eat chalah in Eretz Yisroel on Yom
HaAtzmaut. A "minhag" of sorts. The casual observer might be
deceived into believing that that day is some kind of Tom Tov. How ludicrous!
When the Gedolim of a certain era watched klal Yisroel carry their
knives to the Bais HaMikdosh on an Erev
Pesach that fell on Shabbos they were the observers of a bona-fide minhag, part of the nation's heritage
and an indication of how things should be. It was the unprogrammed reaction of
the community to a given situation. But the origin of the "minhag" to eat chalah on Yom HaAtzmaut is completely artificial, purely the result
of state indoctrination.
So distended has the influence of public opinion become that
it may even be said that a basic principle of halacha, minhag Yisroel Torah hee, Jewish customs have the
force of law, is inapplicable in the United States today. This means that any minhag hamakom peculiar to the United States
or any locality thereof is suspect, and is to be disregarded if it cannot be
traced back definitely to a genuine Halachic source. In all probability its
origin is of dubious legitimacy. It is almost certainly not grounded in halacha.
It was at one time customary in New York City for the rabbis present at a
wedding to precede the choson and kallah to the chupa. The caterers at these affairs always caused difficulties
when a dignitary refused to follow this "local custom". Once, Rav
Reuven Grodzovsky Z”tl was present at a wedding and was asked to proceed to the
chupa to await the choson and kallah. He declined, explaining afterwards that any American minhag of unknown origin should be
assumed to have derived from some church custom. At a church wedding the priest
formally weds the pair; he awaits them at the altar and they must approach him.
The custom was evidently adopted at one time by the Jews (or the caterers) of New York City .
The pressures of public opinion cause people to turn away
from Torah and from the guidance of their Gedolim. It causes them to follow the
whims of a self-serving, powerful few. It is a strong enough force to have
persuaded millions to believe in so patent a falsehood as the blood libel, as
one prominent Hebrew writer of the last century pointed out. It is obligatory
for those involved in the education of our children to use all means at their
disposal to train them not to be influenced by what they see and hear and read
in the alien society that surrounds them.
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